According to world-wide media reports, clock "roll-over" from December 31, 1999 at 23:59:59 hours to January 1, 2000 at 00:00:01 hours happened in all time zones without any serious effect. Many of these reports were published very shortly after the critical rollover time, based on "direct" observations such as electricity or telephone services "still working". Indeed, no plane crashes or nuclear power plant incidents were observed in any part of the world.

Such reports were essentially supported with "summaries" from governments and international organisations arguing that "all critical areas (electricity, communication, banking and infrastructures) are green". Media published the "good news" in a sense that "Y2k effects had grossly be overestimated", and investments into preventing anticipated Y2k effects were hardly justified, at least the amount of worldwide 1 billion $ was regarded as too high.

Starting shortly after midnight in first time zones (e.g. Japan), information "leaked" out that some Y2k-related effect had surfaced, but in almost all cases this was immediately rated as having had "minor or no effects" (if admittedly Y2k-related at all). After few days, most media were no longer interested in Y2k-related news; even thosee "watch lists" which had planned to inform the Internet community about ongoing developments were closed.

Consequently, the public view of the Y2k rollover experience is: nothing essential happened, and those who warned did this essentially for their (personal or company) benefit.

This view is not only UNJUSTIFIED: apart from the fact that no serious expert had predicted chaos or crashes either for the rollover period itself nor for the following periods, it was very clear that it would be very difficult even for experienced investigative journalists to find out if and what really happened. Indeed, much more happened than what was reported.

This view is also DANGEROUS: complex information and communication systems tend to be full of "bugs", with the date-dependent "Y2k bug" being just one of them. Exploitation of weaknesses of contemporary systems is even today a major problem, e.g. through malicious software (viruses, worms, trojan horses) and malevolent attackers (crackers). When enterprises rely on such "weak" technologies, the trust in those experts finding and curing "bugs" will be growingly important.

Consequently, it is of major importance to collect and present information about "what really happened" upon and after "roll-over" from Dec.31,1999 to Jan.1,2000 and into Year 2000. This research project and its website is organised to share related information.